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Introduction 
The pandemic crisis has accelerated the entry of financial technology (“fintech”) firms 
into the banking industry.  Some of the new fintech banks are owned or controlled by 
commercial enterprises.  Affiliations between commercial firms and fintech banks raise fresh 
concerns about the dangers of mixing banking and commerce.  Recent scandals surrounding the 
failures of Wirecard and Greensill Capital (Greensill) reveal the potential magnitude of those 
perils. 
 In the U.S., the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) have encouraged commercial enterprises to acquire fintech 
banks.  The FDIC has authorized commercial firms to acquire FDIC-insured industrial banks in 
reliance on a controversial loophole in the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act).  The OCC is 
seeking to charter nondepository fintech national banks, which commercial firms could own 
under a separate exemption in the BHC Act.  The FDIC’s and OCC’s initiatives undermine – and 
could potentially destroy – the BHC Act’s longstanding policy of separating banking and 
commerce.1   
 
1 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The OCC’s and FDIC’s Attempts to Confer Banking Privileges on Nonbanks and 
Commercial Firms Violate Federal Laws and Are Contrary to Public Policy,” 39 Banking & Financial Services 
Policy Report No. 10 (Oct. 2020), at 1 [hereinafter Wilmarth, “Banking Privileges”], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3750964; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The FDIC Should Not Permit Commercial Firms to 
Acquire Industrial Banks,” 39 Banking & Financial Services Policy Report No. 5 (May 2020), at 1 [hereinafter 
Wilmarth, “Industrial Banks”], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3613022.   
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 The debacles at Wirecard and Greensill demonstrate the importance of maintaining a 
strict separation between banking and commerce.  Regulators in Germany and other countries 
allowed banks controlled by Wirecard and Greensill to engage in risky and abusive transactions 
that benefited their parent companies and other related parties, including commercial firms 
connected to their major investors.  Wirecard Bank provided financial support to its parent 
company and CEO, and it also made fraudulent transfers of funds to insiders and their controlled 
entities.  Greensill Bank made preferential and unsound loans that benefited its parent company 
and leading investors.  Greensill Bank securitized many of its reckless loans, and Greensill 
Capital sold the resulting asset-backed securities as “safe” and “liquid” investments to 
misinformed investors.   
Regulators failed to take timely enforcement actions against Wirecard and Greensill 
because they did not exercise consolidated supervisory authority over the complex international 
structures created by both firms.  In addition, Wirecard and Greensill built extensive networks of 
influence that produced significant political favors and regulatory forbearance in Germany and 
the U.K.  The collapse of Wirecard and Greensill embarrassed government agencies and inflicted 
massive losses on investors, creditors, and other stakeholders.   
 The failures of Wirecard and Greensill provide clear warnings about the dangers of 
allowing fintechs to offer banking services while evading prudential regulatory requirements and 
supervisory standards that apply to traditional banks and their corporate owners.  Regulators and 
policymakers should not allow fintechs’ claims of “innovation” to serve as a rationale for 
regulatory arbitrage and as camouflage for fraud.  Both disasters show that high-tech firms 
engaged in banking and commercial activities are likely to create the same unacceptable hazards 
as previous banking-and-commercial conglomerates, including toxic conflicts of interest, 
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reckless lending, dangerous concentrations of economic power and political influence, 
supervisory blind spots, and systemic threats to economic and financial stability.  
Analysis 
1.  The Rise and Fall of Wirecard 
In its 2017 annual report to shareholders – entitled “Digitise Now” – Wirecard stated that 
it was “a global technology group” offering “one of the world’s fastest growing digital platforms 
in the area of financial commerce.”  Wirecard processed “electronic payments from all sales 
channels” and combined “innovative digital payment solutions” with “data analytics” to create a 
“comprehensive ecosystem” for its customers.2  Wirecard provided a wide range of services in 
addition to processing payments, such as risk management, fraud prevention, call centers, and 
customer loyalty programs.  Wirecard also furnished the technology needed to support those 
services, including “self-learning algorithms” and other forms of “machine learning” and 
“artificial intelligence.”3   
Wirecard was founded in Germany in 1999.  A few years later, Wirecard purchased a 
failed call center company and took over that firm’s listing on the Frankfurt stock exchange.  
Wirecard acquired a German bank in 2006 and renamed it Wirecard Bank.  The acquisition of 
Wirecard Bank enabled Wirecard to gain access to Visa’s and Mastercard’s payment networks 
and to become an issuer of credit cards as well as an acquirer of payments from other issuers of 
 
2 Wirecard 2017 Annual Report, at front cover, 7-8, 40-46, 59, 71-72 (April 2018), available at 
https://www.wirecard.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Annual-Report-2017.pdf.  See also Consolidated Class 
Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, In re Wirecard AG Securities Litigation, Civ. 
Action No. 2:20-cv-03326-AB (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 22, 2020), ¶¶ 34-36, 84-90 [hereinafter Wirecard Securities 
Litigation Complaint], available at https://www.hbsslaw.com/sites/default/files/case-downloads/securities/2020-12-
22-Wirecard-Consol-Compl.pdf.  
3 Wirecard 2017 Annual Report, supra note 2, at 7-8, 40-46, 51-72, 88-93, 128-34 
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credit cards.4  Wirecard’s “unusual hybrid of banking and non-banking operations [made] its 
accounts harder to compare with peers, and [helped] persuade investors to rely on the company’s 
adjusted versions of financial statements.”5  
Wirecard furnished payment processing and other services to a wide variety of online 
merchants, including retailers, travel companies, and providers of digital music, as well as firms 
operating in “legal grey areas,” such as gaming, sports betting, and pornography.  Wirecard 
allegedly set up shell companies and established fake accounts that helped a California company 
to conceal its sales of marijuana products so that it could receive credit card payments from 
customers of U.S. banks.6 
 Wirecard Bank offered “multi-channel” payment services that covered “more than 40 
alternative payment methods” and “[o]ver 100 transaction currencies.”  Wirecard Bank 
processed payments for merchants around the globe on credit and debit cards issued by Visa, 
Mastercard, American Express, Diners Club, Discover, JCB, and UnionPay.  Wirecard Bank also 
offered “innovative solutions” to meet the “e-Commerce business” needs of its customers, 
 
4 Paul J. Davies, “Tech Star Wirecard Fell Apart in Days,” Wall Street Journal (July 3, 2020), A1; Dan McCrum, 
“Wirecard: the timeline,” Financial Times (June 25, 2020), available at https://www.ft.com/content/284fb1ad-ddc0-
45df-a075-0709b36868db; Wirecard Securities Litigation Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 83-89. 
5 McCrum, supra note 4. 
6 Liz Alderman & Christopher F. Schuetze, “Many Analysts Not Surprised by Downfall of Wirecard,” New York 
Times (June 27, 2020), A1; Davies, supra note 4; McCrum, supra note 4; Dan McCrum & Olaf Storbeck, 
“Wirecard’s future in doubt after missing cash sparks investor flight,” Financial Times (June 19, 2020), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/149cd24c-7a0d-4ef0-a46c-fece79124322; Rebecca Davis O’Brien, “Trial Alleges 
Wirecard Aided Marijuana Scam,” Wall Street Journal (Mar. 24, 2021), B5; see also Wirecard Securities Litigation 
Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 34-36. 84-86.   
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including mobile payments, money transfers, online banking, and digital wallets.7  A separate 
Wirecard subsidiary furnished information technology services and management consulting.8  
Wirecard acquired payment firms in several Asian countries and purchased Citigroup’s 
payment processing businesses in North America and Asia.  Wirecard became known as 
“Germany’s PayPal,” and it claimed to handle over $140 billion of payments annually for 
250,000 global corporate customers.  Wirecard’s market valuation peaked at €24 billion in 
August 2018.  One month later, Wirecard was added to Germany’s Dax 30 index, replacing 
Commerzbank (Germany’s second largest bank).  In 2019, Wirecard launched “Project Panther,” 
a bold plan to acquire Deutsche Bank (Germany’s largest bank).  Under that plan, prepared by 
McKinsey & Company, Wirecard would have become “Wirebank” and would have achieved its 
ambition of “thinking and acting like a fintech, at the scale of a global bank.”9     
Wirecard was “Europe’s largest fintech” and “one of Germany’s most feted companies” 
in 2018.  It was widely viewed as a “European tech champion” as well as a “homegrown success 
story.”  Wirecard’s CEO, Markus Braun, became a “rock star” and a “legend” in “the elite 
corridors of corporate Germany.”  Braun “promoted the concept of a fully cashless society from 
which players like Wirecard would benefit,” and he “predicted that all retail payments would be 
 




8 Offering Memorandum dated 9 September 2019 for €500 million 0.50% Notes due 2024 [hereinafter Wirecard 
2019 Offering Memorandum], at 47, available at https://www.wirecard.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/12/02_20190912_Wirecard_Offering_EN.pdf.  
9 Davies, supra note 4; McCrum, supra note 4; Olaf Storbeck, “Wirecard: the frantic final months of a fraudulent 
operation,” Financial Times (Aug. 25, 2020) (quoting plan prepared by McKinsey & Co.), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/6a660a5f-4e8c-41d5-b129-ad5bf9782256; Wirecard 2019 Offering Memorandum, 
supra note 8, at 2, 62; Wirecard 2017 Annual Report, supra note 2, at 45-46, 94-95, 138-40; Wirecard Securities 
Litigation Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 87-90.  
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digital within a decade.”10  In 2019, he “pledged that [Wirecard’s] revenue and operating profit 
by 2025 would be more than six times higher than they were in 2018, as consumers around the 
world abandoned cash.”11  
In April 2019, Wirecard entered into a “strategic partnership” with Japan’s SoftBank.  
SoftBank acquired €900 million of Wirecard’s convertible bonds, thereby giving SoftBank a 
potential equity stake of more than 5% in Wirecard.  (In September 2019, SoftBank sold those 
bonds to institutional investors in a deal arranged by Credit Suisse.)  SoftBank agreed to help 
Wirecard expand its activities in Asia, especially in Japan and South Korea.  SoftBank also 
encouraged its “sprawling portfolio of tech firms” to buy payment services from Wirecard.12   
Wirecard entered into payment services agreements with several firms controlled by 
SoftBank.  SoftBank’s “strategic partnership” with Wirecard triggered a significant rise in 
Wirecard’s stock price.  In August 2019, Moody’s gave Wirecard an investment-grade rating of 
“Baa3.”  Moody’s favorable credit rating helped Wirecard to sell €500 million of five-year notes 
(also rated “Baa3” by Moody’s) to institutional investors in September 2019.13   
The offering memorandum for Wirecard’s five-year notes stated that SoftBank was a 
“strategic partner and new strategic shareholder” for Wirecard.  According to the memorandum, 
 
10 Alderman & Schuetze, supra note 6; Davies, supra note 4; McCrum, supra note 4; Dan McCrum et al., “Wirecard 
collapses into insolvency,” Financial Times (June 25, 2020), available at https://www.ft.com/content/650d7108-
dca8-4299-95ad-e68476bc3020. 
11 McCrum & Storbeck, supra note 6. 
12 Myriam Balezou, Pavel Alpeyev & Kat Van Hoof, “Wirecard’s Complex Tie-Up with Softbank Unravels After 
Insolvency, Bloomberg Law (July 2, 2020); Ryan Browne, “Softbank’s troubled $1 billion Wirecard bet under 
scrutiny as troubled payments processor fights for survival,” CNBC (June 26, 2020), available at 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/24/softbanks-1-billion-wirecard-investment-under-scrutiny.html; McCrum et al., 
supra note 10; Caitlin Ostroff & Margot Patrick, “SoftBank Seeks to End Its Wirecard Partnership,” Wall Street 
Journal (July 2, 2020), B1; Margot Patrick, “Lenders Magnify Wirecard Shock,” Wall Street Journal (June 24, 
2020), B12; Margot Patrick, Bradley Hope & Liz Hoffman, “SoftBank’s Stamp Elevated Wirecard,” Wall Street 
Journal (July 30, 2020), B1; Robert Smith & Arash Massoudi, “Softbank executive set to lose profits from Wirecard 
trade,” Financial Times (June 22, 2020), available at https://www.ft.com/content/b8eec9d0-0c85-467d-8cb1-
467ad87adced; Wirecard 2019 Offering Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3-4, 33-34, 62. 
13 Balezou, Alpeyev & Van Hoof, supra note 12; Browne, supra note 12; Ostroff & Patrick, supra note 12; Patrick, 
Hope & Hoffman, supra note 12; Wirecard 2019 Offering Memorandum, supra note 8, at 35, 116. 
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SoftBank’s support would enable Wirecard to “further expand and consolidate its own market 
position” in Japan, South Korea, and other Asian countries.  Wirecard’s “strategic partnership” 
with SoftBank would also promote Wirecard’s sales of payment and technology services to 
SoftBank’s portfolio of companies in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, “e-
commerce platforms,” and “FinTech.”14   
Wirecard received additional support from large global banks.  ABN Amro, Citigroup, 
Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, ING, and Lloyds Bank acted as lead underwriters 
for Wirecard’s successful offering of five-year notes in September 2019.  Wirecard obtained a 
five-year, €1.75 billion line of credit from ABN Amro, Commerzbank, ING, and other banks in 
June 2018.  Wirecard drew down most of that line of credit before the company collapsed two 
years later.15    
Wirecard’s stock received strong backing from European asset managers.  Investment 
analysts at major European banks and leading European investment firms posted favorable 
investment ratings on Wirecard’s stock until shortly before Wirecard collapsed.16  The head of 
Deutsche Bank’s Asian business encouraged Asian clients to do business with Wirecard until a 
few months before Wirecard failed.17   
 Wirecard’s meteoric rise did not go unchallenged.  Beginning in 2008, and with 
increasing intensity after 2014, a growing number of shareholder activists, journalists, securities 
analysts, and hedge fund managers expressed serious doubts about the accuracy of Wirecard’s 
 
14 Wirecard 2019 Offering Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3-4. 
15 Id. at cover page, 7-8, 62, 118; McCrum et al., supra note 10. 
16 McCrum & Storbeck, supra note 6; Paul Murphy, “The fund managers who kept faith with Wirecard,” Financial 
Times (June 19, 2020), available at https://www.ft.com/content/b3d664db-17c3-4648-8c10-b8bd667e290e; Berndt 
Ziesemer, “Why was Frankfurt so blind for so long about Wirecard?”, Financial Times (June 19, 2020), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/f04793df-43a2-4d69-a39f-e04dac36ce8e; Wirecard Securities Litigation Complaint, 
supra note 2, ¶¶ 96, 102-03, 106, 109, 111-12, 142, 155, 186, 221-23. 
17 Olaf Storbeck, “Top Deutsche Banker wooed clients for Wirecard months before collapse,” Financial Times (Feb. 
17, 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/c34b1e3d-c758-4203-b98b-360fe319770f.  
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financial statements.  In fact, Wirecard’s activities in Europe and North America were 
unprofitable for several years before the company failed, and much of its reported business in 
Asia was a sham.  For at least a decade, Wirecard issued fraudulent financial statements that 
inflated its assets, revenues, and profits.  Senior Wirecard officials also arranged fraudulent 
transactions involving large transfers of Wirecard’s funds to companies they controlled.18  
Wirecard Bank extended a €35 million loan to Markus Braun in January 2020, at a time when 
Braun faced significant personal financial problems.  Wirecard Bank also made suspicious 
transfers of large amounts of cash to Wirecard’s insiders and foreign affiliates.19  
Wirecard collapsed into insolvency in June 2020, after its external auditors discovered 
that Wirecard’s reported deposits of €1.9 billion in an overseas bank did not exist.  Those 
fictitious deposits were equal to all of the net profits Wirecard reported after 2012.  Wirecard’s 
failure wiped out its equity investors and triggered €12.4 billion of creditor claims.  The 
company’s remaining assets were expected to cover only a small fraction of those claims.20  
 As Wirecard experienced mounting financial problems, Wirecard Bank obtained 
additional funding for its parent company by soliciting more deposits.  Wirecard Bank attracted 
 
18 Ruth Bender & Paul J. Davies, “Wirecard Fraud Is Traced to 2015,” Wall Street Journal (July 23, 2020), B1; Paul 
J. Davies, “Adviser Linked to Wirecard’s Deals,” Wall Street Journal (Nov. 19, 2020), B1; Jack Ewing, “Former 
Wirecard C.E.O. Arrested on New Charges.” New York Times (July 23, 2020), B4; Bradley Hope, Paul J. Davies & 
Patricia Kowsmann, “Wirecard’s No. 2 Was Key to the Firm’s Rapid Rise,” Wall Street Journal (July 6, 2020), B1; 
Olaf Storbeck, “Wirecard fraud ‘started more than a decade ago’,” Financial Times (Mar. 23, 2021), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/650d7108-dca8-4299-95ad-e68476bc3020; Olaf Storbeck, Stefania Palma & Dan 
McCrum, “Prosecutors suspect Wirecard was looted before collapse,” Financial Times (Aug. 7, 2020), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/c8acf321-7bc7-4348-99f6-b17e01085238; Dylan Tokar & Paul J. Davies, “Wirecard 
Executive Says Warning Signs Were Clear,” Wall Street Journal (Feb. 9, 2021), B11; Wirecard Securities Litigation 
Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 92-245, 263-302, 325-62. 
19 Olaf Storbeck, “Wirecard’s Markus Braun took €35m loan from group’s banking arm,” Financial Times (July 16, 
2020) (reporting that Braun repaid the loan in March 2020, after Wirecard’s supervisory board urged him to do so), 
available at https://www.ft.com/content/2650cf4a-4ca5-4f99-9916-cb5cae4bde73; Olaf Storbeck, “Wirecard 
employees removed millions in cash using shopping bags,” Financial Times (April 22, 2021), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/31a8ed93-f602-47f0-9120-4b4f152ec7bc.; Olaf Storbeck, “Marsalek’s assistant handled 
six-digit amounts of cash in plastic bags,” Financial Times (May 7, 2021), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/eef0e06f-a206-4b6e-8c7f-4350f767978b.      
20 Alderman & Schuetze, supra note 6; Eyk Henning et al., “Wirecard Bank Has $237 Million, Administrator Says 
(Correct),” Bloomberg Law (Nov. 18, 2020); McCrum et al., supra note 10; McCrum & Storbeck, supra note 6; 
Storbeck, supra note 9. 
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new deposits by paying interest rates that were significantly higher than the deposit rates offered 
by most other German banks.  Wirecard Bank’s deposits rose to $2 billion in 2019, an increase 
of more than 25% from the previous year.  After Wirecard collapsed in June 2020, Germany’s 
banking regulator, BaFin, “ringfenced” Wirecard Bank to prevent the bank from making any 
additional loans or other transfers of funds to its parent company, affiliates, or insiders.  German 
authorities subsequently obtained court approval to liquidate Wirecard Bank under the 
supervision of Wirecard’s insolvency administrator.21 
2.  Failures by Wirecard’s Regulators and Auditors 
 Wirecard developed strong relationships with “a vast network of businessmen, 
politicians, and lobbyists” in Germany.  Wirecard hired several prominent former German 
officials as advisers and lobbyists, including a former minister of defense and Bavaria’s former 
chief of police.  German officials viewed Wirecard as “a rare German tech success story” and a 
“national tech champion,” and they eagerly promoted Wirecard’s ventures at home and abroad.  
In 2019, the former defense minister persuaded Chancellor Angela Merkel to encourage Chinese 
officials to approve Wirecard’s acquisition of a Chinese payments company.22   
Wirecard also built “close ties” to German intelligence and law enforcement agencies.  
For example, Wirecard provided fee-free credit cards to the staff of Germany’s criminal police 
agency (BKA).  In 2014, Wirecard’s chief financial officer told his colleagues, “We will become 
the BKA’s house bank at some point.”  A special investigator stated that BKA “put the fox in 
 
21 Nicholas Comfort & Steven Arons, “Wirecard Bank Ringfenced by Germany’s BaFin After Insolvency (1),” 
Bloomberg Law (June 25, 2020); Henning et al., supra note 20.  
22 Guy Chazan, “Wirecard enjoyed ‘no special treatment,’ Merkel says,” Financial Times (April 23, 2021), available 
at https://www.ft.com/content/b37bde10-53c9-4592-ad01-9a44f83b9c77; Guy Chazan & Olaf Storbeck, “Wirecard 
inquiry: Germany’s financial and political elite exposed,” Financial Times (April 19, 2021) [hereinafter “Wirecard 
inquiry”], available at https://www.ft.com/content/6e0c6b5f-3461-463d-b49b-f572dbc39c26; Guy Chazan & Olaf 
Storbeck, “Wirecard: the scandal spreads to German politics,” Financial Times (Sept. 29, 2020) [hereinafter 
“Wirecard scandal”], available at https://www.ft.com/content/81779b15-7b1d-404f-b523-d61510397dd4;.  
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charge of the henhouse” and failed to uncover evidence of widespread money laundering by 
Wirecard.23  
In 2020, Germany’s Bundestag established a special committee to investigate why the 
German government did not discover Wirecard’s massive fraud for more than a decade.  
Members of the special committee strongly criticized Germany’s ministry of finance, BaFin, and 
German prosecutors for ignoring “compelling, substantiated indications of criminal activity at 
Wirecard.”  One of the committee members, Lisa Paus, concluded that “[a]t all the critical 
junctures, [German officials] decided in favour of Wirecard.”  Journalists reported that “none of 
Germany’s regulatory authorities have emerged from the Wirecard proceedings with their 
reputation unscathed.”24   
BaFin did not launch a serious investigation of Wirecard until shortly before it failed, 
despite numerous allegations of misconduct by shareholder activists and financial journalists 
since 2008.  Instead of investigating Wirecard, BaFin launched criminal inquiries alleging 
market manipulation by shareholders and journalists who published negative stories about 
Wirecard.  In addition, BaFin imposed a two-month ban on short-selling of Wirecard’s stock in 
February 2019.  BaFin stated that its short-selling ban was justified by “a serious threat to market 
confidence” as well as Wirecard’s “importance for the economy.”  When BaFin ordered the ban, 
it asked Germany’s accounting oversight board to review Wirecard’s financial statements.  The 
 
23 “Wirecard inquiry,” supra note 22; Olaf Storbeck, “German police had close ties with Wirecard, report shows,” 
Financial Times (April 14, 2021) (quoting a 2014 email message from Wirecard’s chief financial officer, Alexander 
von Knoop, and also quoting the special investigator’s report), available at https://www.ft.com/content/ba9a578b-
d03f-4d77-91f0-b7ae7606a115. 
24 “Wirecard inquiry,” supra note 22 (quoting statements by Free Democrat MP Florian Toncar and Green Party MP 
Lisa Paus); see also “Wirecard scandal,” supra note 22. 
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weak and thinly-resourced oversight board did not issue any report before Wirecard collapsed 
more than a year later.25     
 BaFin defended its failure to uncover Wirecard’s fraud by claiming that it did not have 
authority to examine the affairs of Wirecard and its nonbank subsidiaries.  BaFin classified 
Wirecard as a technology company rather than a “financial holding company.”  As a result of 
that classification, BaFin supervised only Wirecard Bank and did not scrutinize the bank’s parent 
company and other affiliates.26  In November 2020, the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) issued a report that found serious “deficiencies in [BaFin’s] supervision and 
enforcement of Wirecard’s financial reporting.”  ESMA’s report questioned whether BaFin 
possessed adequate authority and political independence to prevent financial fraud by influential 
companies like Wirecard.27  
 Ernst & Young audited Wirecard’s financial statement for a decade but similarly failed to 
detect Wirecard’s massive fraud until a few weeks before it collapsed.  Among other lapses, 
Ernst & Young allowed Wirecard’s senior management to terminate prematurely the auditor’s 
inquiry into a whistleblower’s claims of fraud and bribery in Wirecard’s operations in India.  In 
addition, for more than three years, Ernst & Young failed to discover the nonexistence of 
Wirecard’s foreign deposits because its auditors relied on assurances from Wirecard’s executives 
 
25 Tom Fairless, Patricia Kowsmann & Paul Davies, “Wirecard Warnings Were Ignored,” Wall Street Journal (July 
17, 2020), A1; “Wirecard inquiry,” supra note 22; “Wirecard scandal,” supra note 22; see also Katja Langenbucher 
et al., What are the wider supervisory implications of the Wirecard case? 7-8, 12-13, 19-21, 30-33 (PE 651.385, 
Nov. 2020) (study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee), 
available at 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/651385/IPOL_STU(2020)651385_EN.pdf; Wirecard 
Securities Litigation Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 100-04, 123, 140-43. 
26 Guy Chazan & Olaf Storbeck, “Head of German financial watchdog defends agency’s Wirecard role,” Financial 
Times (July 1, 2020), available at https://www.ft.com/content/fd2e1442-d35c-412e-a7a5-aa4d5b52e629; Fairless, 
Kowsmann & Davies, supra note 25; Langenbucher et al., supra note 25, at 19; “Wirecard inquiry,” supra note 22; 
“Wirecard scandal,” supra note 22.  
27 European Securities and Markets Authority, “ESMA identifies deficiencies in German supervision of Wirecard’s 
financial reporting,” (Nov. 3, 2020) (press release), available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-
news/esma-identifies-deficiencies-in-german-supervision-wirecard%E2%80%99s-financial; Patricia Kowsmann, 
“Wirecard Probe Faults Regulators,” Wall Street Journal (Nov. 4, 2020), B12. 
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and did not directly contact the bank that supposedly held the deposits.28  An investigation 
commissioned by the Bundestag’s special committee concluded that Ernst & Young ignored 
“numerous fraud risk indicators,” which should have caused Ernst & Young to intensify its 
audits of Wirecard’s financial statements.29   
3.  The Rise and Fall of Greensill 
 Lex Greensill grew up on his family’s farm in Australia.  He moved to the U.K. in 2001, 
earned an M.B.A. degree, and worked as an investment banker for Morgan Stanley and 
Citigroup.  In 2011, Greensill launched his own finance company, Greensill Capital.  Greensill 
Capital acquired a German bank in 2014 and renamed it Greensill Bank.30   
Greensill specialized in supply-chain finance, “a fancy name for the age-old practice of 
factoring.”  Greensill extended credit to its corporate customers by purchasing, at a discount, 
invoices that its customers owed to suppliers of goods and services.  Greensill later collected the 
full amounts due from its customers on the invoices and earned profits equal to the discounts 
provided by the suppliers.  Supply-chain lenders generally provide financing to large, well-
established companies for periods of 30 to 120 days, with the possibility of renewal.  Greensill, 
 
28 Langenbucher, supra note 25, at 13-16, 30-33; Olaf Storbeck, “EY fraud expert: ‘incomprehensible’ that Wirecard 
‘red flags’ were ignored,” Financial Times (May 7, 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/0288d7b1-1e52-
4a3d-a9e1-6850afae0d26; Olaf Storbeck, “Whistleblower warned EY of Wirecard fraud four years before collapse,” 
Financial Times (Sept. 30, 2020), available at https://www.ft.com/content/3b9afceb-eaeb-4dc6-8a5e-b9bc0b16959d; 
Olaf Storbeck, Tabby Kinder & Stefania Palmer, “EY failed to check Wirecard bank statements for 3 years,” 
Financial Times (June 26, 2020), available at https://www.ft.com/content/a9deb987-df70-4a72-bd41-47ed8942e83b; 
Wirecard Securities Litigation Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 10-16, 103-04, 108, 172-74, 183-84, 218-19, 227-30, 
246-76, 314-23.  
29 Olaf Storbeck, “EY’s Wirecard audits suffered serious shortcomings, German probe finds,” Financial Times 
(April 17, 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/abd89375-3fa1-4457-abd6-b3e3231ba339.  
30 Eshe Nelson, Jack Ewing & Liz Alderman, “Debt Drove a Firm’s Rise and Its Ruin,” New York Times (Mar. 31, 
2021), B1; Robert Smith, Michael Pooler & Olaf Storbeck, “The unraveling of Lex Greensill: a mixture of bravado 




however, “supercharge[d]” this “dull banking business” with “aggressive innovation” and 
“revolutionary thinking.”31 
  Greensill said that it was using technology to “digitize” supply-chain finance while also 
“expand[ing] the client base” to serve smaller and newer firms.  Greensill provided most of its 
supply-chain financing to higher-risk companies that could not obtain such credit from 
traditional banks.  About 90% of Greensill’s revenues came from corporate borrowers that did 
not qualify for investment-grade credit ratings.32   
Lex Greensill “portrayed himself as a savior for small business.”  He declared that 
Greensill’s high-tech business model was “making finance fairer” and “democratising capital,” 
thereby “changing finance to change the world.”  One of Greensill’s early investors commented, 
“Lex is a great salesman . . . . He’s got this ‘good old boy farmer made good’ story.  But I think 
his ambition is reckless.”33   
 Former U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron praised Greensill Capital as “one of 
Britain’s many fintech success stories.”  Greensill claimed to be “disrupting big banks” with 
 
31 Patrick Jenkins, “The echoes of Enron in Greensill saga,” Financial Times (Mar. 29, 2021), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/70ba9c03-e207-4187-b62f-4b73c8fcac19; Duncan Mavin, Julie Steinberg & Margot 
Patrick, “Before Greensill Imploded, Credit Suisse Saw Danger,” Wall Street Journal (Mar. 4, 2021), B1; John 
Plender, “Greensill implosion exposes risks of shadow banking,” Financial Times (Mar. 7, 2021), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/ebeec5fc-4e52-4dd7-9aa1-092df6f0d97b; Robert Smith, “Greensill and supply-chain 
financing: how a contentious funding tool works,” Financial Times (Mar. 2, 2021), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/1bbbe94c-9c3d-43d1-bcdd-8add6557c5a7.   
32 Lucca De Paoli et al., “In Stunning Collapse, SoftBank-backed lender Greensill files for U.K. insolvency,” 
Fortune (Mar. 9, 2021), available at https://fortune.com/2021/03/09/collapse-softbank-backed-lender-greensill-u-k-
insolvency/; Duncan Mavin & Julie Steinberg, “Behind Greensill’s Collapse: Detour Into Risky Loans,” Wall Street 
Journal (Mar. 13, 2021), A1 [hereinafter “Behind Greensill’s Collapse”];    
33 Duncan Mavin & Julie Steinberg, “Before Greensill Failed, It Relied on Wall Street,” Wall Street Journal (Mar. 
24, 2021), A1 [hereinafter “Greensill Relied on Wall Street”]; “‘System-generated truncations’: Greensill, Gupta, 
and the hunt for the mystery holding company,” Financial Times (Aug. 20, 2020), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/dcc1807a-fb14-47db-b1b0-3337d905b298; Smith, Pooler & Storbeck, supra note 30 
(quoting “one of [Greensill’s] early backers”).  
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superior technology.  However, Greensill’s “revolutionary innovation” mainly consisted of 
“complex financial engineering,” which greatly increased the risks of Greensill’s operations.34   
Instead of keeping risky supply-chain invoices on its balance sheet, Greensill used 
securitization and credit insurance to convert those invoices into “low risk” asset-backed 
securities.  Greensill Bank purchased customer invoices and held them in its “warehouse” until 
they could be securitized into bonds that were sold to investment funds managed by GAM 
Holding (GAM) and Credit Suisse.  Greensill, GAM, and Credit Suisse told investors that 
Greensill’s invoice-backed bonds were “safe, highly rated, fully-insured investments” that could 
be redeemed by investors on short notice (usually five or 10 days).35   
Greensill obtained credit insurance for its bonds from several Australian insurance 
companies.  Credit Suisse assured investors that Greensill’s bonds were “low risk” because 
“[t]he underlying credit risk of the [Greensill] notes is fully insured by highly rated insurance 
companies.”36   
Greensill’s invoice-backed bonds bore a disturbing resemblance to the subprime 
mortgage-related securities that global banks marketed as “safe” investments during the 2000s in 
reliance on credit insurance provided by AIG and monoline bond insurers.  In both cases, banks 
performed the “alchemy” of packaging risky debts into supposedly “low risk” securities with 
 
34 “Greensill Relied on Wall Street,” supra note 33; Plender, supra note 31; Andrew Woodman, “Weekend Pitch: In 
Greensill’s fintech debacle, where does the buck stop?”, Pitchbook (Mar. 28, 2021) (quoting Mr. Cameron), 
available at https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/greensill-debacle-fintech-regulation-softbank.  
35 “Behind Greensill’s Collapse,” supra note 32; Jenkins, supra note 31; Duncan Mavin & Julie Steinberg, 
“Problems Intensify for Greensill,” Wall Street Journal (Mar. 3, 2021), B1; Mavin, Steinberg & Patrick, supra note 
31; Nelson, Ewing & Alderman, supra note 30; Plender, supra note 31; Smith, Pooler & Storbeck, supra note 30. 
36 Tom Bergin, “Greensill insurance mystery turns up the heat on Credit Suisse,” Reuters (April 1, 2021), available 
at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-greensill-credit-suisse-insig/greensill-insurance-mystery-turns-up-the-
heat-on-credit-suisse-idUSKBN2BO4VP; Tom Braithwaite, “The insurance call that toppled Greensill,” Financial 
Times (Mar. 4, 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/ebeec5fc-4e52-4dd7-9aa1-092df6f0d97b; Mavin, 
Steinberg & Patrick, supra note 31; Ian Smith et al., “The Australian underwriter who provided Greensill Capital’s 
lifeline,” Financial Times (Mar. 16, 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/9722efce-7d32-4abd-99b8-
46f6b47de6dc; Smith, Pooler & Storbeck, supra note 30. 
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support from credit insurers.  Thus, Greensill’s “innovation” created ominous “echoes of the 
asset-backed securitization that was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis.”37 
 Greensill magnified the risks of its invoice-backed bonds in three ways.  First, Greensill 
securitized “projected receivables” from anticipated future sales as well as invoices from actual 
past sales.  For example, Greensill provided $850 million of supply-chain credit to Bluestone 
Resources, a West Virginia coal mining company.  Most of that financing was based on 
“projected receivables” from future sales of Bluestone’s coal to “prospective buyers.”  Similarly, 
Greensill extended large amounts of credit to Sanjeev Gupta’s firms based on “future 
receivables.”  Greensill’s financing of “hypothetical invoices” from “anticipated [future] 
business . . . went well beyond industry norms” and was far riskier than traditional supply-chain 
financing.  Moreover, Greensill’s primary credit insurer, Tokio Marine, warned Greensill that its 
credit insurance would guarantee payment of invoices only if they documented actual sales of 
goods or services.38 
 Second, Greensill offered long-term financing commitments to its most important 
customers.  Greensill reportedly agreed to provide financing to Sanjeev Gupta’s companies for at 
least three years, General Atlantic for at least three years, Bluestone for at least six years, and 
Tradeshift Network (a company controlled by SoftBank) for five years.  Greensill fulfilled those 
 
37 Braithwaite, supra note 36; Jenkins, supra note 31; Nelson, Ewing & Alderman, supra note 30; Plender, supra 
note 31; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Taming the Megabanks: Why We Need a New Glass-Steagall Act 208-11, 
218-21, 230-42 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2020) (describing the subprime mortgage-related securities that global banks 
sold to investors during the 2000s) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Taming the Megabanks]. 
38 John Basquill, “Banks steer clear of GFG after Greensill collapse leaves funding gap,” Global Trade Review 
(April 21, 2021), available at https://www.gtreview.com/news/global/banks-steer-clear-of-gfg-after-greensill-
collapse-leaves-funding-gap/; Bergin, supra note 36; Duncan Mavin & Julie Steinberg, “Greensill Accused of Fraud 
by Coal Miner,” Wall Street Journal (Mar. 17, 2021), B12 [hereinafter “Greensill Accused of Fraud”]; Jenkins, 
supra note 31; Robert Smith, Cynthia O’Murchu & Owen Walker, “Suspect Sanjeev Gupta invoices used in 
Greensill raise fraud concerns,” Financial Times (April 9, 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/e450c8f9-
29fa-432b-98fd-5885edb4680f; see also Tom Braithwaite, “The finance inventor whose vision blurred at Greensill 
Capital,” Financial Times (Mar. 19, 2021) (stating that Bluestone “borrowed $780m [from Greensill] against 
‘receivables that have not yet been generated by Bluestone’ from ‘prospective buyers’ which included ‘entities that 
were not and might not ever become customers of Bluestone’”), available at https://www.ft.com/content/c02ba2e1-
71d2-4fb1-8166-4ad712b4ace2.     
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longer-term commitments by repeatedly renewing (rolling over) its customers’ short-term 
invoices.  However, as noted above, Greensill’s bonds were sold to investors as “short-term 
liquidity vehicles similar to money market funds,” and the terms of those bonds promised 
payment on short notice.   
Greensill’s longer-term financing commitments created a severe liquidity mismatch with 
its bonds’ promise of short-term repayment.39  Greensill’s invoice-backed bonds created the 
same illusion of immediate liquidity as the asset-backed commercial paper – backed by illiquid, 
subprime mortgage-related securities – that global banks sold to investors prior to the financial 
crisis of 2007-09.40   
 Third, Greensill provided much of its financing to firms that exercised significant 
influence over Greensill because they were major investors in Greensill or closely connected to 
those investors.  General Atlantic, a large private equity firm, invested $250 million in Greensill 
in 2018.  Greensill responded by providing a $350 million loan to General Atlantic to 
“strengthen its relationship with a significant sponsor.”  General Atlantic used that loan to 
finance a joint venture with Deutsche Börse, a German stock exchange operator.  Greensill 
provided additional support for that joint venture by extending $95 million of supply-chain 
finance to Deutsche Börse.41   
 
39 “Behind Greensill’s Collapse,” supra note 32; “Greensill Accused of Fraud,” supra note 38; Lawrence Fletcher & 
Robert Smith, “Investors pull money from GAM and Greensill supply chain fund,” Financial Times (June 2, 2019), 
available at https://www.ft.com/content/f6d210e6-8394-11e9-b592-5fe435b57a3b; Robert Smith et al., “Sanjeev 
Gupta denies debts are due ahead of crunch meeting,” Financial Times (April 1, 2021), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/d7fd7673-e4de-402d-acec-5aea358ee461.  
40 Plender, supra note 31; Robert Smith, Kaye Wiggins & Cynthia O’Murchu, “General Atlantic: the revered tech 
investor that backed Greensill,” Financial Times (Mar. 25, 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/cdb7f2fe-
7589-457e-8c5d-e5f515c557da; see also Wilmarth, Taming the Megabanks, supra note 37, at 218-20, 244-45, 250-
51, 254-59 (discussing the asset-backed commercial paper that global banks sold to investors prior to the global 
financial crisis of 2007-09). 
41 “Behind Greensill’s Collapse,” supra note 32; Miriam Gottfried, “Disrupter Startup Gets Injection,” Wall Street 
Journal (July 16, 2018), B2; Smith, Wiggins & O’Murchu, supra note 40; Julie Steinberg & Duncan Mavin, 
“Greensill Made Loans to Its Top Backers,” Wall Street Journal (Mar. 6, 2021), B1. 
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 Greensill provided extensive credit to firms controlled by SoftBank, which was 
“Greensill’s largest outside backer.”  Greensill was a “key part” of Softbank’s strategy of 
acquiring ownership stakes in “the world’s leading tech companies and encouraging them to 
cooperate.”  SoftBank wanted Greensill “to offer struggling SoftBank startups easy access to 
credit without having to pledge onerous collateral.”42    
SoftBank invested $1.9 billion in Greensill during 2019 and 2020 and acquired 25% of 
Greensill’s stock.  In March 2020, SoftBank invested an additional $1.5 billion in Credit Suisse’s 
funds that bought Greensill’s invoice-backed bonds.  SoftBank’s additional investment stabilized 
Credit Suisse’s funds at a time when many investors were making withdrawals in response to the 
Covid pandemic.  In return, Greensill provided more than $1 billion of credit to companies 
controlled by SoftBank’s Vision Fund.43   
 Greensill provided an even larger share of its credit to companies controlled by Sanjeev 
Gupta.  Gupta was Greensill’s biggest customer and a significant early investor.  Between 2013 
and 2020, Gupta and his corporate group, GFG Alliance, spent over $6 billion building a global 
industrial empire that included metals, mining, and power generating facilities in a dozen 
countries on four continents.  Gupta’s empire employed 35,000 people and produced $20 billion 
of revenues in 2020.44 
 
42 Julie Steinberg et al., “SoftBank Confronts Deeper Losses on Greensill,” Wall Street Journal (Mar. 10, 2021), A1;  
Giles Turner, Lucca De Paoli & Pavel Alpeyev, “How Masayoshi’s Son’s ‘money guy’ Lex Greensill went from 
hero to zero,” Bloomberg (April 2, 2021), available at https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/how-
masayoshi-son-s-money-guy-lex-greensill-went-from-hero-to-zero-121040100134_1.html.  
43 Steinberg et al., supra note 42; Turner, De Paoli & Alpeyev, supra note 42; Margot Patrick et al., “Credit Suisse 
Failed to Heed Alerts on Archegos, Greensill,” Wall Street Journal (April 9, 2021), B1; Julie Steinberg & Duncan 
Mavin, “Deal Making Caught Up with Lex Greensill,” Wall Street Journal (Mar. 19, 2021), B1.  
44 Alistair MacDonald, “Greensill Problems Put Spotlight on an Anglo-Indian Steel Tycoon,” Wall Street Journal 
(Mar. 4, 2021), B2; Alistair MacDonald & Duncan Mavin, “Greensill-Gupta Tie Had Raised Concerns,” Wall Street 
Journal (April 5, 2021), B6; Sylvia Pfeifer, Oliver Barnes & Jamie Smyth, “Sanjeev Gupta’s empire faces test of its 
steel,” Financial Times (Mar. 10, 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/fedcf26c-4313-4649-b628-
9a2884b3e43e; Michael Pooler & Robert Smith, “The workings of Sanjeev Gupta’s empire,” Financial Times (Feb. 
26, 2020), available at https://www.ft.com/content/5f279604-5719-11ea-a528-dd0f971febbc; Eddie Spence, 
“Greensill Crisis Pressures Ambitious ‘Savior of Steel’ Gupta,” Bloomberg (Mar. 3, 2021), available at 
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 Greensill became Gupta’s primary source of credit in 2017, after several large banks 
stopped providing loans to Gupta.  Greensill extended more than $7 billion of credit to Gupta’s 
firms by 2019.  Greensill tried to reduce its credit exposures to Gupta’s companies in 2019 and 
2020, in response to pressure from BaFin, GAM, and Credit Suisse.  However, Gupta’s 
companies still owed $5 billion to Greensill in March 2021.45   
 During the last three years of its operations, Greensill found it increasingly difficult to 
sell all of its invoice-backed bonds to GAM and Credit Suisse.  Consequently, Greensill Bank 
kept a larger share of Greensill’s loans on the bank’s books.  At the end of 2020, Greensill Bank 
had a loan portfolio of €3.5 billion, including more than €2 billion of credit extended to Gupta’s 
companies.  Greensill Bank’s credit exposures to Gupta’s companies doubled between 2018 and 
2020, and the bank’s total assets grew from €3.8 billion to €4.5 billion between 2019 and 2020.  
Greensill Capital borrowed almost £100 million from Greensill Bank during the last few months 
before Greensill Capital collapsed in March 2020.46   
In March 2021, Greensill Bank held total deposits of €3.6 billion, including €700 million 
of uninsured deposits from German municipalities and other institutional investors.  German 




45 Basquill, supra note 38; “Behind Greensill’s Collapse,” supra note 32; MacDonald & Mavin, supra note 44; 
Alistair MacDonald & Rhiannon Hoyle, “Tycoon Seeks to Delay Payments of Billions in Debt to Greensill,” Wall 
Street Journal (Mar. 10, 2021), B2; Robert Smith et al., “How Sanjeev Gupta lived large on the back of rickety 
financing,” Financial Times (Mar. 19, 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/8d5956d2-33e0-4ab0-a6d9-
76cf63929bd9; Robert Smith, Arash Massoudi & Olaf Storbeck, “BaFin pushes Greensill Bank to reduce its 
exposure to Sanjeev Gupta,” Financial Times (Feb. 18, 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/44c47737-
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46 Mavin & Steinberg, supra note 35;  Smith, Pooler & Storbeck, supra note 30; Robert Smith & Olaf Storbeck, 
“German regulator files criminal complaint against Greensill Bank,” Financial Times (Mar. 3, 2021), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/dd0735f9-3587-4d1c-977b-6554dfc4c019; Smith, Massoudi & Storbeck, supra note 45; 
Julie Steinberg, Ben Dummett & Patricia Kowsmann, “Greensill to File for Insolvency,” Wall Street Journal (Mar. 
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deposits that were significantly higher than the rates paid by other German banks, with the 
prominent – and equally troubling – exception of Wirecard Bank.  During the same period, many 
German banks either charged fees or paid negative interest rates on institutional deposits.47   
German municipalities held about €500 million of uninsured deposits in Greensill Bank 
when BaFin seized control of the bank in March 2021 and subsequently placed it in liquidation.  
BaFin’s actions stunned municipal officials and other uninsured depositors, and they strongly 
criticized BaFin for not issuing timely public warnings about Greensill Bank’s risks.  In April 
2021, the administrators of Germany’s deposit insurance programs paid €2.7 billion to over 
20,000 individual depositors in Greensill Bank.  Municipalities and other institutional depositors 
were not protected by deposit insurance and did not receive payments.48   
Greensill Bank did not produce substantial profits after Greensill acquired it in 2014.  
BaFin received warnings about Greensill Bank’s very large exposures to Gupta’s companies in 
2019 (from a report issued by a German credit rating agency) and again in 2020 (from a report 
issued by the Association of German Banks).  BaFin told senior executives of Greensill Capital 
 
47 Steven Arons, Nicholas Comfort & Lucca De Paoli, “Billionaire Greensill’s Bank Attracts Regulatory Scrutiny,” 
Bloomberg (Aug. 29, 2020), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-19/billionaire-
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Street Journal (Mar. 17, 2021), B12; Smith & Storbeck, supra note 46; Olaf Storbeck, “German towns braced for 
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watchdog”], available on Westlaw at 2021WLNR 9845402; Jean-Philippe Lacour, “German municipalities left 
reeling by Greensill scandal,” Agence Frence-Presse English Wire (Mar. 17, 2021), available on Westlaw; Duncan 
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year before it failed,” Wall Street Journal (April 1, 2021), B12 [hereinafter “German Regulator Tipped”]; John 
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Storbeck, supra note 47.  
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and Greensill Bank to reduce the bank’s exposures to Gupta’s firms and increase the bank’s 
capital.49   
In May 2019 and November 2020, Greensill used more than $1 billion of funding from 
SoftBank to strengthen Greensill Bank’s capital.  BaFin allowed Greensill Bank to remain in 
operation and to expand its deposits and loans, including loans to Gupta’s firms.  BaFin received 
“whistleblower tips” in 2020 about Greensill Bank’s financial weakness as well as alleged 
fraudulent reports to regulators.  In September 2020, BaFin commissioned a special audit of the 
bank by KPMG.  However, BaFin did not take any public action against the bank until March 3, 
2021.  On that date, BaFin filed a criminal complaint against the bank for suspected accounting 
fraud and seized control of the bank.50      
Greensill’s empire quickly collapsed after Tokio Marine, its largest credit insurer, refused 
to renew €4.6 billion of credit insurance that expired on March 1, 2021.  Greensill sued to 
compel Tokio Marine to renew those policies, but an Australian court rejected Greensill’s 
claims.  Greensill could not find replacement credit insurance, and Credit Suisse and GAM froze 
their investment funds holding Greensill’s invoice-backed bonds.  In addition, Gupta’s 
companies stopped paying invoices they owed to Greensill.  With its major sources of funding 
cut off, Greensill was doomed.  Greensill’s holding companies in Australia and the U.K. filed for 
insolvency administration, and BaFin received court approval to liquidate Greensill Bank on 
 
49 Arons, Comfort & De Paoli, supra note 47; “German Regulator Tipped,” supra note 48; “German watchdog,” 
supra note 48; Smith, Massoudi & Storbeck, supra note 45; Patricia Uhlig, “German bank auditors say lodged 
Greensill Bank complaints in 2020,” Reuters (Mar. 4, 2021), available at 
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21 
 
March 16, 2021.  In April, creditors voted to liquidate Greensill’s top-tier Australian holding 
company.51 
As Greensill unraveled, substantial evidence of fraud emerged.  Greensill Capital’s 
administrator, Grant Thornton, determined that many invoices underlying Greensill’s loans to 
Gupta’s firms were based on “prospective” sales involving companies that had never done 
business with Gupta’s companies and had no plans to do so.52  Similarly, KPMG’s special audit 
of Greensill Bank failed to confirm the validity of many invoices underlying the bank’s loans to 
Gupta’s companies.  Some invoices reflected dubious “sales” purportedly made by Gupta’s 
companies to related firms that were owned by “friends of Sanjeev.”  Others documented 
completed sales but were actually based on “hypothetical” future sales.  BaFin closed Greensill 
Bank after determining that the bank “was unable to provide evidence of the existence” of many 
receivables backing the bank’s loans to Gupta’s firms.53   
4.  Failures by Greensill’s Regulators  
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 Like Wirecard, Greensill developed influential relationships with government agencies 
and hired former officials to strengthen those connections.  Lex Greensill was a close friend of 
Jeremy Heywood after working with Heywood at Morgan Stanley.  Heywood became head of 
the U.K.’s civil service and served as cabinet secretary during David Cameron’s tenure as Prime 
Minister (2010-15).  Heywood gave Greensill a desk in the Cabinet Office, and the Cameron 
government appointed Greensill as a “crown representative” to advise on procurement issues.  
Greensill strongly encouraged the U.K. government to increase its use of supply-chain financing.  
In 2017, Greensill received a Commander of the British Empire award “for services to the 
economy.”54 
In 2015, Greensill hired Bill Crothers, the U.K.’s head of government procurement, first 
as a part-time adviser (shortly before Crothers retired) and then as a director.  Greensill also 
hired David Cameron as an adviser in 2018.  In the same year, the U.K. government awarded 
Greensill and Taulia, a fintech firm, a joint government contract to provide supply-chain 
financing for invoices owed by the U.K.’s National Health Service (NHS) to pharmacies.  After 
the Covid pandemic broke out in 2020, Greensill offered to give NHS employees early access to 
their paychecks (without charge) through advance payments made by Greensill.  Greensill 
described its “early payments” plan as a “piece of altruism.”  Greensill used that “altruism” to 
promote its lobbying campaign to qualify as a participant in the U.K. government’s guarantee 
programs for pandemic business loans.55   
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In June 2020, the British Business Bank approved Greensill as a provider of government-
guaranteed loans to U.K. businesses in amounts up to £50 million per qualified borrower.  
Greensill extended “hundreds of millions of pounds” of government-guaranteed loans to Gupta’s 
firms, including new shell companies that Gupta set up for “the sole purpose of securing more 
taxpayer-backed loans through Greensill.”  David Cameron and John Healey, the Labor Party’s 
shadow defense minister, made repeated – but unsuccessful – efforts to persuade top-level 
officials to approve Greensill for even larger pandemic loan guarantee programs established by 
the U.K. Treasury and the Bank of England.56 
 Lex Greensill made similar efforts to exploit his government connections in Australia and 
Germany.  He hired Julie Bishop, Australia’s former foreign minister, as an adviser.  With 
Bishop’s help, Greensill tried (but failed) to persuade Australian officials to retain Greensill for 
an early payments program for Australian government employees.  David Cameron 
unsuccessfully urged Germany to hire Greensill for a similar early payments scheme for German 
government workers.57   
 
telling watchdog,” Financial Times (Mar. 30, 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/93561de9-6d74-4267-
bcff-9759b4b1e01c; Robert Smith, “Greensill tried to use NHS pay ‘gift’ as a lever to sell supply chain finance,” 
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Lex Greensill obtained better results when he dispatched Cameron to Australia in 2018 to 
strengthen Greensill’s relationship with Greg Brereton.  Brereton was the lead underwriter for 
Bond & Credit Co. (BCC), Greensill’s primary provider of credit insurance.  Greensill’s 
relationship with Brereton flourished until Tokio Marine acquired BCC in 2019 and fired 
Brereton in 2020.  Tokio Marine alleged that Brereton breached his risk limit by approving 
almost $8 billion of credit insurance for Greensill’s invoice-backed bonds.58  
 Greensill increased its political clout through its status as the principal funding source for 
Sanjeev Gupta’s industrial empire.  Gupta was acclaimed as “the savior of steel” as he acquired 
troubled steel mills and other struggling industrial facilities in Australia, France, the U.K., and 
several other countries.  The U.K. provided £1 billion of loan guarantees to support Gupta’s 
British operations.  Greensill’s role as the leading financier for Sanjeev Gupta created a 
symbiotic relationship between Greensill and Gupta.59  Government agencies were likely 
reluctant to crack down on Greensill in light of Gupta’s heavy dependence on Greensill’s 
funding. 
 Financial regulators in Germany, the U.K., and Australia failed to respond in a timely or 
effective manner to Greensill’s growing risks.  As described above, BaFin monitored Greensill 
Bank’s financial condition between January 2019 and March 2021, and it also received reports 
and whistleblower tips about the bank’s financial dangers and suspected fraud.  BaFin persuaded 
Greensill’s management to inject about €1 billion of new capital into Greensill Bank during 2019 
and 2020.  BaFin allowed Greensill Bank to continue growing and to double the size of its 
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Gupta-related exposures between 2018 and 2020, while paying above-average interest rates that 
attracted large amounts of deposits (including uninsured deposits from German municipalities).60   
BaFin did not detect evidence of fraud or other criminal activities when it reviewed 
Greensill Bank during the first half of 2020.  In September 2020, BaFin commissioned KPMG to 
perform a special audit of the bank.  By January 25, 2021, KPMG “uncovered evidence that 
called into question the future of the bank and revealed ‘serious violations by the management’.”  
Despite KPMG’s findings, BaFin did not issue public warnings or institute public enforcement 
measures against Greensill Bank until it seized control of the bank on March 3, 2021.61   
BaFin may have delayed taking action against Greensill Bank because of Sanjeev 
Gupta’s attempt to buy a large German steel operation in the fall of 2020.  In October 2020, 
Gupta made an unsolicited offer to purchase the troubled steel division of Thyssenkrupp AG, a 
large German industrial conglomerate.  In mid-February 2021, Thyssenkrupp terminated its 
negotiations with Gupta due to concerns about several issues, including Gupta’s heavy reliance 
on Greensill’s supply-chain financing.  In view of the importance of Thyssenkrupp’s steel 
division to the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia, it is possible that BaFin refrained from 
taking public action against Greensill Bank until Thyssenkrupp rejected Gupta’s bid.62      
In sum, BaFin’s supervisory record at Greensill Bank was only marginally better than its 
woeful performance at Wirecard Bank.  BaFin adopted the same “blinkered” supervisory 
 
60 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
61 Arons, Comfort & De Paoli, supra note 47; Maria Fritzsche, “First Wirecard, now Greensill Bank lead to 
questions for BaFin,” Thomson Reuters Regulatory Intelligence (Mar. 12, 2021), available on Westlaw; “German 
Regulator Tipped,” supra note 48; Smith & Storbeck, supra note 46; Spence, supra note 44; Storbeck, supra note 
47. 
62 Joe Miller & Robert Smith, “Thyssenkrupp ends talks with Gupta’s Liberty over steel unit,” Financial Times 
(Feb. 17, 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/cd80a3e0-02d9-4ed3-a44a-fdbd68196e20; Michael Pooler, 
Joe Miller & Robert Smith, “Sanjeev Gupta in spotlight after swoop on Thyssenkrupp steel unit,” Financial Times 
(Oct. 25, 2020), available at https://www.ft.com/content/1679627e-c294-426e-ace4-9d75d83c8661; Smith, 
Massoudi & Storbeck, supra note 45; Julie Steinberg et al., “SoftBank-Backed Lender Faces Insolvency with Funds 
Blocked,” Wall Street Journal (Mar. 2, 2021), A1. 
26 
 
approach toward Greensill Bank as it did toward Wirecard Bank.  In each case, BaFin focused its 
attention on the bank and did not attempt to ascertain the full range of financial risks posed by 
the bank’s parent company, affiliates, insiders, influential investors, and customers.  According 
to German MP Lisa Paus, "The Greensill Bank case fits seamlessly into a long list of oversight 
failures in recent years.”63    
  U.K. regulators did intervene to prevent the failure of Wyelands Bank, a U.K. bank that 
Sanjeev Gupta owned.  In 2020, the U.K. Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) ordered 
Wyelands Bank to conduct “an independent review of its lending practices and financial 
controls.”  The PRA determined that Wyelands Bank had extended credit to Gupta’s companies, 
as well as firms owned by “friends of Sanjeev,” in amounts that exceeded legal limits on bank 
lending to “connected entities.”  The PRA also found that Wyelands Bank – like Wirecard Bank 
and Greensill Bank – offered “highly attractive deposit rates” to obtain funding for its loans to 
related parties.64  In March 2021, the Bank of England ordered Wyelands Bank to return all 
deposits held by its retail customers.  The Bank of England also directed Gupta to inject £75 
million of new capital into Wyelands Bank.65  
However, U.K. authorities did not take timely or effective measures to prevent the 
collapse of Greensill Capital, despite numerous warning signs.  Serious problems with 
Greensill’s supply-chain financing became a matter of public knowledge in 2018.  GAM fired 
Tim Haywood, a senior fund manager, after determining that he violated GAM’s risk 
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management policies by purchasing huge amounts of Greensill’s bonds, including many bonds 
backed by invoices owed by Gupta’s firms.  GAM demanded a reduction in the exposure of its 
fund to Gupta’s companies.  Gupta paid off more than more than $700 million of Greensill bonds 
held by GAM, using funds provided by Greensill and Greensill Bank.  In addition, Morgan 
Stanley purchased $300 million of Greensill bonds held by GAM and repackaged those bonds 
into new securities that Morgan Stanley sold to its own clients.  In June 2019, House of Lords 
member (and former U.K. financial services minister) Paul Myners urged the Conservative 
government to investigate the Greensill-GAM scandal, but no public inquiry occurred.66   
In early 2020, NMC, which operated a chain of hospitals, failed after receiving large 
amounts of supply-chain financing from Greensill.  NMC’s collapse was considered “one of the 
worst corporate governance scandals to hit the London stock exchange.”  Several other large 
recipients of Greensill loans failed during the pandemic crisis.  Even so, “as red flags cropped 
up, Greensill remained in high esteem among British officials,” and Greensill was allowed to 
participate in one of the U.K.’s pandemic loan guarantee programs.67        
Greensill Capital’s ability to remain in business until March 2021 owed much to Lex 
Greensill’s relationships with David Cameron and other former and present U.K. government 
leaders.  As Lord Myners observed after Greensill collapsed, British ministers and civil servants 
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“seemed at times bewitched” by Lex Greensill.  “There was a failure to ask basic questions about 
him and how his business had so quickly become a big player in such a significant market.”68   
Lord Myners repeatedly warned government officials about Greensill’s “potential 
systemic risk and fraud.”  However, his warnings elicited “nothing but bland responses from 
government and financial regulators who appeared to have no appetite to ask some pretty 
obvious questions.”  Myners concluded that the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) was 
“culpable” for failing to respond to “the warning signs around Greensill.”  Kevin Hollinrake, a 
Conservative MP and chair of a Parliamentary group on fair business banking, agreed that the 
FCA “fail[ed] to fulfill” its mandate when it allowed Greensill Capital “to operate in the UK in 
the shadows” for so long.69 
The FCA delegated oversight of Greensill Capital to ACA Mirabella, a private company 
that served as Greensill’s “appointed representative” and was responsible for ensuring 
Greensill’s compliance with the FCA’s investment disclosure requirements.  ACA Mirabella 
cancelled its representation a few days before Greensill Capital failed, but it did not issue any 
public warnings.  As one journalist commented, the FCA’s delegation of supervisory 
responsibility for Greensill Capital to a private entity was “a dubious set-up for keeping watch on 
a company of Greensill’s size – it arranged about $50 billion of financing last year alone.”70  
Australian regulators also failed to take meaningful steps prior to the collapse of 
Greensill’s top-tier holding company, which was incorporated and headquartered in Australia.  
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The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) paid little attention to Greensill before it failed.  The passivity 
of Australian agencies is difficult to explain, in light of Greensill’s headquarters in Australia and 
its heavy reliance on credit insurance provided by Australian insurance companies.  In addition, 
Greensill provided essential financing for Sanjeev Gupta’s Australian steel mills and other 
production facilities, which employed 7,000 people.71  
In late November 2020, John Hempton, an Australian hedge fund manager, warned 
APRA and ASIC about the financial risks posed by Greensill’s operations as well as the very 
large potential claims faced by Tokio Marine and Insurance Australia Group (IAG) as credit 
insurers for Greensill’s bonds.72  Despite Kempton’s warning, APRA and ASIC did not take any 
enforcement actions against Greensill before it collapsed into insolvency in March 2021.  ASIC 
was “largely unconcerned about the operations of Greensill,” and ASIC did not begin to 
investigate Greensill’s operations until after it failed.  Like their German and British 
counterparts, APRA and ASIC did not recognize or respond in a timely way to Greensill’s 
growing dangers, particularly in view of Greensill’s role as primary financier for Gupta’s 
empire.73  
5.  Failures by Wirecard’s and Greensill’s Private-Sector Gatekeepers  
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 Asset managers supported the rapid growth of both Wirecard and Greensill.  As discussed 
above, European asset managers were major backers of Wirecard’s stock.  SoftBank’s Vision 
Fund served as a strategic investor and key funding source for both Wirecard and Greensill.  
Investment funds managed by General Atlantic, GAM, and Credit Suisse provided much of the 
funding that fueled Greensill’s expansion.74   
 Global banks and a credit rating agency also played key roles in promoting both firms.  
Credit Suisse, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, and several large European banks underwrote 
Wirecard’s offering of £500 million of five-year notes in 2019.  The disclosure memorandum for 
that offering included general references to allegations of accounting fraud and other misconduct 
involving Wirecard.  However, the disclosure memorandum minimized the significance of those 
allegations, and it did not reveal the magnitude of Wirecard’s fraud (including its fictitious 
foreign deposits).75   
In October 2020, Credit Suisse and Citigroup tried to raise $1 billion of new funding for 
Greensill Capital through a private offering of equity and debt securities to institutional 
investors.  The “initial pitch documents” for the offering touted Greensill’s “underwriting 
excellence” and its “proven high quality management team.”  However, the pitch documents did 
not discuss Greensill’s growing credit losses or BaFin’s demands for additional capital infusions 
into Greensill Bank.  Credit Suisse’s and Citigroup’s “fundraising drive” for Greensill was not 
successful, due in large part to contemporary news stories that described Greensill’s mounting 
problems during 2020.76   
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  Morgan Stanley repackaged and sold about $300 million of Greensill’s bonds held by 
GAM and backed by invoices from Sanjeev Gupta’s companies, after GAM insisted on reducing 
its exposure to those bonds in 2018.  Moody’s provided investment-grade credit ratings for 
Wirecard’s five-year notes and Greensill’s invoice-backed bonds.  Moody’s did not downgrade 
its credit ratings for either Wirecard or Greensill until each firm faced imminent failure.77 
 Credit Suisse made the biggest and most costly mistakes about Greensill.  In 2020, Credit 
Suisse’s top executives still viewed Lex Greensill as a highly desirable client, despite Greensill’s 
well-publicized difficulties and numerous warnings from Credit Suisse’s risk managers.  Credit 
Suisse’s chief risk and compliance officer, Lara Warner, told her subordinates to leave the 
“academic ivory tower” and become “more commercial” and “aligned” with the bank’s 
dealmakers.  Warner and other senior executives approved a $160 million bridge loan to 
Greensill Capital in the fall of 2020 – while Credit Suisse and Citigroup were trying to sell 
Greensill’s securities to institutional investors – over the objections of Credit Suisse’s risk 
managers.  Greensill Capital defaulted on that loan in March 2021.78   
 Credit Suisse allowed its investment funds to buy $10 billion of Greensill bonds, many of 
which were backed by obligations of high-risk companies.  In addition, Credit Suisse did not 
confirm that Greensill maintained valid credit insurance coverage on its bonds.  Credit Suisse 
evidently did not know that many of Greensill’s bonds were backed by invoices for 
“prospective” rather than actual sales, even though Tokio Marine’s credit insurance denied 
 
77 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing Moody’s ratings for Wirecard and its five-year notes); 
“Greensill Relied on Wall Street,” supra note 66 (discussing Morgan Stanley’s sale of Greensill bonds held by 
GAM, and reporting that Moody’s assigned its third-highest investment rating to Greensill’s bonds, indicating 
“upper medium credit quality,” and did not downgrade Greensill’s bonds until March 2021). 
78 Mavin, Steinberg & Patrick, supra note 31; Stephen Morris et al., “How Credit Suisse rolled the dice on risk 
management – and lost,” Financial Times (April 20, 2021) [hereinafter “Credit Suisse rolled the dice”], available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/cb708ba2-ea8c-4c66-9190-0255fa5112e3; Stephen Morris et al., “Credit Suisse 




coverage for “prospective” invoices.  Credit Suisse also did not know, until March 1, 2021, that 
Tokio Marine had refused to renew $4.6 billion of its credit insurance, even though Tokio 
Marine gave six months’ notice of that refusal to Greensill.79   
In mid-April 2021, Credit Suisse announced that its investment funds held $2.3 billion of 
bonds backed by “problematic loans” from Greensill to Gupta’s firms, Bluestone Resources, and 
Katerra (a failing construction company owned by SoftBank’s Vision Group).  Credit Suisse 
estimated that investors in its funds could potentially lose up to $3 billion.  An investors’ class 
action suit was filed against Credit Suisse in April 2020, alleging that the bank’s risk 
management failures inflicted massive losses on the plaintiffs.80 
 As shown above, most private-sector gatekeepers proved to be no better than government 
regulators in identifying or restraining the growth of speculative risks at Wirecard and Greensill.  
The one major exception was Tokio Marine, whose refusal to renew $4.6 billion of credit 
insurance triggered Greensill’s collapse.81   
Three factors contributed to the failures of private-sector gatekeepers.  First, and most 
importantly, they considered Wirecard and Greensill to be valuable clients because they paid 
lucrative fees.  The same desire to generate fees compromised the integrity and destroyed the 
effectiveness of many private-sector gatekeepers during the 1990s and 2000s.82  Second, it was 
difficult for gatekeepers to evaluate the risks posed by Wirecard and Greensill because they were 
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large international enterprises with complex corporate structures and far-flung business 
operations.  Third, Greensill was a privately-held company and therefore was not subject to the 
disclosure requirements for publicly-traded companies.  Despite those challenges, widespread 
publicity about Wirecard’s and Greensill’s problems and suspected fraud should have caused 
private-sector gatekeepers to exercise a much higher level of scrutiny in dealing with both 
companies.83  
6.  Lessons from the Failures of Wirecard and Greensill 
 a.  Companies that combine banking and commercial activities create toxic conflicts 
     of interest. 
 When Congress passed the BHC Act in 1956, one of its principal purposes was to 
separate banking and commerce by prohibiting affiliations between banks and commercial firms.  
In 1970, 1987, and 1999, Congress amended the BHC Act to close loopholes that allowed 
combinations between commercial enterprises and federally-insured depository institutions.  On 
all four occasions, Congress determined that banking-and-commercial conglomerates seriously 
undermined the objectivity of bank lending and encouraged preferential and reckless credit 
practices.  Congress recognized that commercially-owned banks had powerful incentives to use 
their government-subsidized deposits – the cheapest source of funding in the private sector – to 
provide unsound loans to help their commercial affiliates and customers of those affiliates.84    
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 The disasters at Wirecard and Greensill provide additional evidence that toxic conflicts of 
interest are very likely to occur when banks affiliate with commercial firms.  Wirecard Bank 
made large transfers of funds to prop up its parent company and to benefit its insiders and 
companies they controlled.  Greensill Bank provided excessive and unsound credit to its leading 
investors – General Atlantic, SoftBank, and Sanjeev Gupta – as well as affiliates and customers 
of those investors.  Preferential and reckless loans contributed to Wirecard Bank’s failure and 
were the primary cause of Greensill Bank’s collapse.  
b.  Combinations between banks and commercial firms create dangerous 
     concentrations of economic power and political influence as well as systemic threats 
    to economic and financial stability. 
Congress had additional goals in adopting the BHC Act, including the prevention of 
hazardous concentrations of economic power and political influence and the avoidance of 
systemic threats to economic and financial stability.  Congress understood that banking-and-
commercial conglomerates were likely to wield excessive economic power and political 
influence and to enjoy unfair competitive advantages over commercial firms that did not control 
banks.  Members of Congress expressed great concerns about the economic power and political 
influence that giant banking-and-commercial cartels exercised in Germany and Japan before and 
during World War II, as well as their active support for Fascist dictatorships in both countries.85     
Congress also recognized that problems arising in banking-and-commercial 
conglomerates were very likely to spread across the entire span of those enterprises, creating 
systemic threats to economic and financial stability.  Historical experience provides abundant 
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evidence that validates Congress’s concerns.  During the early 1930s, (i) several large U.S. banks 
with industrial or commercial real estate affiliates failed, and (ii) numerous universal banks with 
close connections to industrial enterprises collapsed in Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and 
other European countries.  During the 1990s, Japan, South Korea, and Mexico experienced 
systemic economic and financial crises as serious disruptions spread across their banking-and-
commercial conglomerates.  During the financial crisis of 2007-09, the federal government 
bailed out three banking-and-commercial conglomerates (GM-GMAC, GE-GE Capital, and 
CIT).86    
Like other banking-and-commercial conglomerates, Wirecard and Greensill became 
powerful sources of political influence for their insiders.  Both organizations built extensive 
networks with former and current government officials to obtain government subsidies, political 
favors, and regulatory forbearance.  The histories of both companies reinforce longstanding 
concerns that enterprises combining banking and commercial activities are likely to amass 
unacceptable levels of political influence.  
Wirecard and Greensill also illustrate the risks of contagion produced by combinations 
between banks and commercial firms.  When Wirecard and Greensill encountered serious 
problems, their subsidiary banks tried to support their parent companies.  Both banks failed soon 
after their parent companies filed for insolvency.  The downfalls of Wirecard and Greensill have 
not triggered systemic crises.  However, the potential collapse of Sanjeev Gupta’s industrial 
empire – if it cannot replace Greensill’s financing – could have serious and adverse economic 
impacts in several countries.87    
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In addition, Wirecard’s failure would have posed a very severe systemic threat to 
Germany’s economy and financial system if Wirecard had carried out its bold plan to acquire 
Deutsche Bank before Wirecard’s massive fraud was revealed.  In that case, Wirecard and 
Wirecard Bank would almost certainly have been bailed out by the German government, just as 
the U.S. government rescued GM, GMAC, and GE Capital during the financial crisis of 2007-
09.88 
c.  Consolidated supervision of banks and their affiliates is crucial.  However, 
    consolidated supervision is not likely to be effective for banking-and- 
    commercial conglomerates. 
The Wirecard and Greensill disasters have once again demonstrated the inadequacy of 
bank-centric supervision.  A banking regulator cannot determine the full range of risks posed by 
a bank’s affiliates – including the risks of unsound loans and other preferential transactions 
involving those affiliates and their insiders and customers – unless the regulator exercises 
comprehensive and consolidated supervisory authority over the bank, its parent company, and its 
other affiliates.  BaFin supervised only Wirecard Bank and Greensill Bank and did not attempt to 
supervise their parent companies and affiliates.  BaFin’s bank-centric supervision failed to 
uncover risky and abusive transactions involving affiliates of Wirecard Bank and Greensill Bank 
until both banks were on the brink of failure.89   
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 Moreover, as I have previously argued, it would not be feasible to establish an effective 
system of consolidated supervision for banking-and-commercial conglomerates.  A consolidated 
federal supervisor of such conglomerates would face at least four unsolvable problems.  First, no 
federal banking agency possesses the expertise and resources needed to regulate large 
commercial firms.  Second, appointing a consolidated federal supervisor for banking-and-
commercial conglomerates would lead investors and creditors to expect that the federal 
government would support such conglomerates during future financial and economic crises.  
Third, consolidated supervision would greatly increase the scope and intensity of federal 
regulation over large commercial sectors of our economy, thereby undermining the effectiveness 
of market incentives and market discipline.  Fourth, large banking-and-commercial 
conglomerates would almost certainly be deemed “too big to fail” – a status that greatly reduce 
the effectiveness of supervisory discipline over them.90 
d. Claims of “financial innovation” often serve as a rationale for regulatory arbitrage 
    and as camouflage for fraud.  
Wirecard and Greensill are notable examples of “innovative” fintechs that successfully 
“arbitraged global regulatory architecture” and shielded most of their operations from 
meaningful regulatory oversight.  Both companies acquired banks in Germany, where BaFin 
followed lenient policies and did not exercise consolidated supervision over technology firms 
that controlled small or midsized banks.  Wirecard and Greensill “exploited the gaps” left by 
BaFin’s weak regulation and by similarly lax oversight in other countries, including Australia 
and the U.K.91  
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 The pursuit of regulatory arbitrage has been a persistent and defining strategy for 
fintechs.  Fintechs constantly assert that they need “regulatory sandboxes” and other forms of 
light-touch regulation to capitalize on their “innovative” plans.  A central goal of fintechs is to 
avoid many of the prudential regulatory requirements and supervisory standards that apply to 
traditional banks and their corporate owners.  As indicated above, the FDIC and OCC are 
currently trying to shield commercial owners of fintech industrial banks and fintech national 
banks from regulation under the BHC Act.  The OCC is also attempting to exempt fintech 
national banks from the Community Reinvestment Act and other important regulations that apply 
to FDIC-insured banks.  The FDIC and OCC claim to be promoting “innovation,” but their 
initiatives represent dangerous forms of regulatory arbitrage that undermine the prudential 
regulatory regime for banks, thereby threatening financial stability and consumer protection.92  
 To appreciate the potential hazards of regulatory arbitrage by fintechs, consider China’s 
experience.  “China stands out as the world’s major jurisdiction in which large-scale entry of Big 
Tech firms into financial services has already happened.”93  During the past decade, Ant 
Group/MYBank and Tencent/WeBank have become leading suppliers of deposit, payment, 
lending, and asset management services in China by exploiting their dominant positions in 
ecommerce and hands-off government policies.  The close links between their ecommerce 
activities and their financial services have given Ant Group and Tencent “a decisive advantage in 
terms of access to individual data,” enabling them to compile extensive credit scoring profiles for 
their customers.  Ant Group and Tencent have provided huge volumes of loans to consumers and 
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small businesses through partnerships with regulated banks, while requiring their partner banks 
to assume most of the credit risk for those loans.94    
 In recent months, China has launched a regulatory crackdown against Ant Group, 
Tencent, and other Chinese technology firms.  China has instructed those firms to organize 
separate holding companies for their financial activities and to bring those activities into 
compliance with banking regulations.  Chinese authorities have charged Ant Group, Tencent, 
and other technology firms with anticompetitive practices (such as blocking their customers from 
dealing with competitors), misuse of customer data, reckless and unsound lending, and exerting 
improper influence over government officials.  Those charges, if valid, indicate that Big Tech 
firms are likely to create similar threats to the public interest in the U.S. and other countries if 
they are allowed to offer banking services without complying with the prudential regulatory rules 
and supervisory standards that apply to traditional banks and their corporate owners.95    
Companies that deliberately skirt regulatory boundaries frequently engage in fraud 
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when their business strategies fail to achieve their profit targets.  Commentators have pointed out 
the strong similarities between the infamous Enron scandal and the debacles at Wirecard and 
Greensill.  Like Enron, Wirecard and Greensill each tried to transform itself into an “innovative 
tech-fuelled behemoth” by avoiding regulation and disrupting traditional competitors.  When 
expected profits did not materialize, each company became a “vast fraud” and used 
“obfuscation” – including financial engineering, off-balance-sheet vehicles, and foreign entities – 
to conceal its fraud.96  As John Plender has warned, “Revolutions in finance have a nasty way of 
ending badly, especially when they happen at breakneck speed.”97 
Conclusion 
 Wirecard and Greensill provide cautionary lessons about the perils of allowing 
technology companies to offer banking services without complying with the prudential 
regulatory requirements and supervisory standards governing traditional banks and their 
corporate owners.  Wirecard and Greensill also provide clear warnings about the unacceptable 
risks of combining banking and commercial activities, including toxic conflicts of interest, 
harmful concentrations of economic power and political influence, threats to financial and 
economic stability, regulatory arbitrage, supervisory blind spots, and fraud.  Congress should 
stop the FDIC and OCC from continuing to pursue their efforts to undermine the BHC Act’s 
longstanding and eminently wise policy of separating banking and commerce.   
    
 
96 Martin Arnold, “Fintechs expect regulatory backlash after Wirecard scandal,” Financial Times (July 6, 2020), 
available at https://www.ft.com/content/76f0856d-8b0f-404e-a94d-31584e50c431; Patrick Jenkins, supra note 31 
(quotes); “Wirecard scandal,” supra note 22.  For discussions of Enron’s fraud, see Wilmarth, Taming the 
Megabanks, supra note 37, at 198-203, 219, 385 (note 99), 434 (note 128), and sources cited therein.   
97 Plender, supra note 31.  
